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GROVE CITY COLLEGE V. BELL: TOUCHDOWN
OR TOUCHBACK?
KAREN CZAPANSKIY*
Three statutes bar discrimination against women, minorities, and
the handicapped involved with a program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance:' Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
* B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1969; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1973. Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The au-
thor served as counsel to the group of seventy-four senators and representatives led by Repre-
sentative Claudine C. Schneider that filed a Brief Amicus Curiae in the case of Grove City
College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984). The author wishes to thank Patricia Chappell and
Miriam Fisher for their able and insightful assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Both title IX and section 504 were patterned after title IV. Therefore, the courts
interpret them consistently, whenever appropriate under the statutory language. Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702-03 (1979). Congress consistently has viewed both
titles as complementary and comprehensive bars to discrimination; they share parallel prohi-
bition and enforcement provisions. As Senator Bayh said on reintroducing title IX in 1972:
Central to my amendment are sections 1001-1005, which would prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs. Discrimi-
nation against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is al-
ready prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the
prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order to close
this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of Title VI.
118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
The same history was explained to the House by Representative Mink:
[Representative Erlenborn] states that it would be a dangerous precedent to
empower the Federal Government to cut off funds from colleges and universities if
they adopted discriminatory admissions policies. This precedent was established
with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . . I doubt whether we have to
tell this House that funds have been stopped in accordance with powers already
granted the Federal Government under that act. This is no new precedent. It is
simply an extension of an existing policy not to fund programs with taxpayers' funds
which deny any individual equal protection of the laws.
117 CONG. REC. 39,251-52 (1971). The same parallel construction is true for the relationship
between section 504 and title VI. See Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767,
769 (3d Cir. 1982), af'd .sub nor. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984).
Because of its constitutional dimensions, title VI may be more broadly enforceable
than the other two statutes. See, e.g., University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 328
(E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Dist., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1386-87 (E.D. Mich.
1982), affd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). The Office for Civil Rights of the
Department of Education, however, has announced its intention to apply the Court's inter-
pretation of title IX in Grove City in its enforcement proceedings brought by the government
under title IX, title VI, and section 504. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATION, EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED REPORT 7 (1983). With respect to public en-
forcement, therefore, title VI will be parallel to title IX and section 504. Differences may
occur in private enforcement actions.
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex;2 title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or na-
tional origin; 3 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of handicap.4 From 1964, when title IX
was enacted, until 1982, it was widely assumed that the government's
authority to enforce the statutes was quite broad.5 For example, the
2. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373-75
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1982)), states, in pertinent part:
§ 1681(a). No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...
§ 1682. Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Fed-
eral financial assistance to any education program or activity. . . is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title. . . by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability. . . . Compliance with any require-
ment adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or
refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any
recipient. . . but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular polit-
ical entity, or part thereof, ... in which such noncompliance has been so
found ...
3. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) states, in pertinent
part:
No person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
4. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) states, in perti-
nent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall . . . be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ...
5. See Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1227-31 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
This article focuses on the scope of the government's authority to enforce the civil
rights statutes. Many courts seem to have assumed, without analysis, that the statutory scope
is the same for private parties as for the government. See, e.g., Rice v. President and Fellows,
663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982). However, the holding in
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) that title IX is program-specific was
addressed solely to the government's enforcement power. The Court said:
We conclude, then, that an agency's authority under Title IX both to promulgate
regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limitation of
§§ 901 and 902.
Id. at 538. The Court thus did not decide whether a private party's rights under title IX are
subject to the program-specific limitation of§ 901. The Court seemed to suggest, in fact, that
private parties would be treated differently when it followed the above quotation with a "Cf."
reference to the pages in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979), that
discuss how the language of title IX supports the conclusion that a private right of action is
available under the statute.
One clear difference that could justify the absence of a program or activity limitation
in private suits is that private parties are not entitled to cut off government funding as relief.
That extreme sanction justifies care in its application, and could explain a limitation on the
government's enforcement power that is not needed in private enforcement cases. Similarly,
it may be possible that government enforcement is not constrained by the program-specificity
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government asserted authority to bar discrimination anywhere in an ed-
ucational institution or business or political entity, such as a school sys-
tem, when federal funds were provided to any of the activities
conducted by the institution or entity.6 In 1982, the Supreme Court
undermined that assumption in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,7
which found both the government's regulatory authority to prohibit re-
cipients of federal funds from discriminating and the government's au-
thority to remedy discrimination by terminating funds to be program
specific under title IX.
The Court's program-specific interpretation of title IX turned on
the term "program or activity," which appears identically in all three
civil rights statutes. The Court found that the term limits the govern-
ment's enforcement power more than had been assumed, but the Court
declined to define the extent of the government authority. The Court
suggested three possible approaches or nexus theories to be considered
on remand. Under those nexus theories, the program-specific require-
ment of the statutes could be met where (1) federal funds are spent to
pay the salary of a victim of discrimination; (2) the victim is employed
in a federally-funded program; or (3) the victim participates in a pri-
vately-funded program in which discrimination occurs that affects a fed-
erally-funded program.8
This article will argue that the nexus theories suggested in North
Haven support institution-wide enforcement of the civil rights statutes to
a considerable degree: The Government still could enforce the civil
rights statutes on an institution-wide basis in most circumstances. In its
decision this term in Grove City College v. Bell,9 however, the Court
adopted a "purpose and effect" test to determine what constitutes a
"program."" ° Under that test, the potential for institution-wide enforce-
ment has been reduced to a minimum. This article will discuss the en-
forcement options that were available under North Haven and contrast
them with the enforcement options that are available after Grove City. It
concludes that institution-wide enforcement of the civil rights statutes
will be available in far fewer situations, and that, as a result, significant
civil rights enforcement efforts will be impaired.
If the government lacks the power to enforce civil rights laws
throughout an institution or political entity receiving federal funds, sig-
limitation where the government is seeking a less extreme sanction than a funding cutoff.
Note, The Program-Speifx Reach of Tte IX, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1218-19 (1983).
6. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1229-31 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. 456 U.S. 512, 538 (1982).
8. Id. at 540.
9. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
10. Id. at 1222.
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nificant civil rights objectives advanced during the last two decades will
be impaired. For example, the usefulness of title IX in equalizing edu-
cational opportunities for women and girls will be reduced. A primary
title IX enforcement objective for women during the last decade has
been eliminating sex discrimination in athletics, because it was per-
ceived that the pervasive discrimination suffered by women in athletics
hindered them from taking an equal place in society, both on and off the
playing field.1 " In part, that objective has been achieved. 12 Unques-
tionably, title IX enforcement efforts have been the impetus for much
change.' 
3
If title IX enforcement is restricted to programs that receive trace-
able or specific federal funding, sex discrimination in an athletic pro-
gram cannot be barred because few athletic programs are funded by
federal grants earmarked or specifically intended for their use.' 4 More
commonly, an athletic program is a subordinate unit within an institu-
tion which receives federal funding for a variety of purposes, such as
student aid, construction funds for athletic and non-athletic facilities, or
feeding programs and research grants.' 5 Under the institution-wide
coverage theories, the government has succeeded in attacking sex dis-
11. See Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School
Athletic Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981).
12. At the beginning of the last decade, colleges awarded virtually no athletic scholar-
ships to women. Less than ten years later, women were awarded 10,000 athletic scholarships.
THE HOUSE WEDNESDAY GROUP, TITLE IX AND H. RES. 190: ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION
(1983). See Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. v. Ohio High School Athletic
Ass'n, 647 F.2d 651, 675 app. (noting expenditure differentials as high as one hundred to one
in the money allocated to men's and women's athletic budgets). It is also clear that in athlet-
ics, as in education generally', much work remains to be done before sex discrimination can be
considered a thing of the past. See, e.g., Hearings on Civil Rights in Education before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondat7 Education and Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statement of Rep. Claudine Schneider); Gaal & DiLorenzo, The
Legality and Requirements of HEW's Proposed "Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletes, 6 J.C. & U.L. 161, 162 nn.8-9 (1979-80); Thomas & Sheldon-Wildgen, Women in
Athletics: Winning the Game but Losing the Support, 8 J.C. & U. L. 295, 297-98 n.7, 300 n. 12
(1981-82); Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics. Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88
YALE LJ. 1254, 1254 (1979).
13. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORE HURDLES TO CLEAR (1980).
14. See, e.g., id. at 49 (statement of President Royal, American Football Coaches Associa-
tion); id. at 90 (statement of Kathy Kelly, President, U.S. National Student Association); id.
at 98-99 (statement of John Fuzak, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association); id. at
232-33 (statement of Dallin H. Oakes, President of Brigham Young University and Director
and Secretary of the American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Univer-
sities); id. at 284-85 (statement of Norman Raffel, Head of the Education Committee of the
Women's Equity Action League); id. at 324 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandier, Director, Pro-
ject on the Status and Education of Women, Association of American Colleges).
15. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affdpercuram, 688
F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). But see University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 328-29 (E.D.
Va. 1982); Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 81 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'din
[VOL. 43:379
TOUCHDOWN OR TOUCHBACK
crimination in athletics. In large measure it can continue to do so only
if the term "program or activity" of the civil rights statutes is interpreted
to require recipients to remedy discrimination throughout education
institutions. 6
Institution-wide enforcement is needed to eliminate discrimination
in other areas as well. Although title IX and section 504 bar employ-
ment discrimination,17 in the absence of institution-wide enforcement
authority, those statutes supply no bar to discrimination in an English
or math department of a university because such departments-like ath-
letics-typically receive no federal funds earmarked or specifically dedi-
cated for their use. 8 Efforts to eliminate discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, and handicap in sub-collegiate school systems that receive un-
restricted federal funding such as impact aid and school lunches also
would be limited. 19
A restrictive reading of the program or activity term also will im-
pair enforcement efforts in non-educational institutions, such as private
businesses and local governments, that receive unrestricted federal fund-
ing.2" For example, the current administration has attempted to protect
handicapped infants from possible discrimination in the providing of
health care (the so-called "Baby Doe" rules).2' The government's effort
is premised on the argument that section 504 applies to the privately
funded neonatal nurseries of the hospitals caring for the infants.2 2 Like
athletic programs, many nurseries receive no federal funds that are
either earmarked for, or specifically intended to subsidize, their opera-
tions. Also like athletic programs, the nurseries are housed in hospitals
that receive unrestricted federal funds, such as Medicaid and Medicare
unpub'd op., No. 81-1398 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983), cert. dented, 52 U.S.L.W. 3701 (March 27,
1984); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
16. But see Letter of Paul M. Bator, Deputy Solicitor General, The Washington Post,
Mar. 8, 1984, at A22, col. 3.
17. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1253-54 (1984).
18. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Hatler v. Temple
Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981),affdpercuriam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982); Rice v.
President and Fellows, 663 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982).
19. Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), afdon other
grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983).
20. One example, which will be discussed at greater length later in this article, is Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984), which was argued before the Supreme
Court on the same day as Grove City. In Darrone, the corporation received federal funding for
essentially all of its functions, but none of the federal funds was earmarked specifically for the
position in which the complainant was employed. See infa text accompanying notes 131-34.
21. See Final Rules Concerning Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures
and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1984);
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397-98 (D.D.C. 1983); N. Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at BI, col. 6.
22. American Academy of Pediattncs, 561 F. Supp. at 399.
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payments for the benefit of non-handicapped patients and construction
funds for nursery and non-nursery facilities.23 Just as with athletic pro-
grams, therefore, the government's enforcement efforts can be sustained
only if the program and activity language of section 504 is interpreted to
apply to an entire institution that receives unrestricted funds.
I. THE NORTH HAVEN NEXUS THEORIES
Although commentators often debated its meaning, the term "pro-
gram or activity" received remarkably little attention from the courts
until the Supreme Court's decision in North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell.2 4 North Haven involved two federally supported 5 school districts
which, it was alleged, had discriminated against female employees. Af-
ter investigating the employees' complaints, HEW found that title IX
had been violated and sought corrective actions by the school districts.
Each board then sued HEW to enjoin the enforcement action, arguing
that the regulations barring discrimination in employment under title
IX exceeded HEW's statutory authority because title IX did not pro-
hibit employment discrimination.2 6 Rejecting the school boards' argu-
ments, the Court upheld the HEW regulations prohibiting employment
discrimination.2 7 The Court also examined the regulations to determine
whether they conformed to the program-specific limitation of title IX.2 8
Finding the regulations not inconsistent on their face with title IX's pro-
gram-specific character, the Court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the alleged discrimination was remediable in light of the
program-specific requirement of the statute.2 9 Although the Court de-
clined to define "program" because of the lack of a well-developed rec-
ord,30 it suggested that on remand the defendant school boards could
assert that title IX does not apply when:
1. the complaining employee's salary was not funded by fed-
eral money;
2. the complaining employee did not work in an education
program that received federal assistance; or
3. the discrimination allegedly suffered by the complaining
23. See Memorandum of Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, United States v. University
Hosp., State Univ. of N. Y., No. CV-83-4818 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1983); infra note 111.
24. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
25. The opinion did not specify the types of aid.
26. 456 U.S. at 517-19.
27. Id. at 534-35.
28. Id. at 536-39.




employee did not affect a federally funded program.3 1
In light of the Court's discussion of the program-specificity concept,
federal intervention to enforce the civil rights statutes is barred in the
absence of a sufficient connection or nexus between federal funding and
the discriminating practice. In other words, the program-specific re-
quirement of the statute is satisfied only if some nexus exists between the
federal funds and the discrimination. The nexus requirement is not sat-
isfied in the situations posited by the Court as possible defenses. If the
Court's hypotheticals are restated affirmatively, the nexus between the
funding and the discrimination satisfies the statutory requirement if an
employee's salary is funded by federal assistance, an employee works in
an education program that receives federal assistance, or the discrimina-
tion suffered affects a federally funded program. 2 Each of these nexus
theories has a history in the case law of title IX, title VI, and section 504
and has been found to satisfy the program or activity standard of those
statutes. This section will explore the case law to determine whether
each nexus theory can be sustained after North Haven, and if so, whether
any of the theories permit institution-wide enforcement.
A. The Direct Expenditure Nexus
According to the first theory suggested by the North Haven Court,
the program-specific nexus of the civil rights statutes is satisfied if the
salary of the employee being discriminated against is federally funded.3 3
An institution's discrimination against a particular employee is suffi-
ciently connected to the federal government's funding to fall within the
purview of the civil rights statutes, therefore, if that employee's salary is
federally funded in whole or in part.
The nexus requires two elements: a specific person or group of per-
31. Id.
32. An additional nexus theory has come to be known as the "benefits" theory: If a fed-
eral expenditure on one program frees funds to be spent elsewhere in the institution, discrimi-
nation in the rest of the institution is then barred by the civil rights statutes. Compare Grove
City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 696 (3d Cir. 1982), Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ.,
490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.N.J. 1980), Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 602
(D.S.C. 1974), affidmem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975), with University of Richmond v. Bell,
543 F. Supp. 321, 328 (E.D. Va. 1982). The theory is not tested in the North Haven examples.
While it finds support in the legislative history of title IX, particularly during the congres-
sional consideration of the McClure amendment and the debates on whether athletic pro-
grams are covered by title IX, commentators disagree on its validity. See Note, Title IX."
Women's Collegiate Athletics in Limbo, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 297, 306 n.72 and 307 (1983).
Compare Kuhn, Title IX. Employment and Athletics are Outside HEI's Juridiction, 65 GEO. L.J.,
49, 71 (1976), with Martin, Ttle IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Scoring Points for Women, 8 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 481, 488-90 (1981). The Supreme Court rejected the theory in Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1221 (1984).
33. 456 U.S. at 540.
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sons within an institution who are the identifiable payees of specific fed-
eral funds; and those people receive federal funds only because of their
association with the institution.3 4 For example, a teacher employed by a
school system that receives federal funds to subsidize all teachers' sala-
ries is an identifiable payee of specific federal funds and continues as a
payee until he leaves his teaching post. A Social Security disability in-
surance recipient, on the other hand, is an identifiable payee of specific
federal funds, but she continues to be paid irrespective of any connec-
tion to any institution. If the two elements of the nexus are satisfied, the
civil rights statutes are enforceable to the extent needed to protect pay-
ees from discrimination. If effective protection depends on an entire in-
stitution or entity being discrimination-free, the entire institution is
subject to the civil rights statutes.
To understand how the nexus theory would apply, consider the ex-
ample of students receiving federal educational assistance such as Basic
Education Opportunity Grants (BEOGs).35 The funds are paid to a stu-
dent who uses them to pay for educational expenses, such as tuition. If
the student leaves the institution, he stops receiving the federal funds.
In most educational institutions, students are allowed to participate-
irrespective of the source of their tuition-in all aspects of the educa-
tional and extracurricular life of the institution. Effective protection of
the federally funded student, therefore, means ensuring that no student
in the entire institution is discriminated against. To ensure effective
protection, the civil rights statutes should be enforceable throughout the
institution.
The purpose and the language of the civil rights statutes indicate
34. Id. at 520-21.
35. The most common forms of federal financial aid for students are Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants ("BEOGs" or "Pell Grants," after their Senate originator, Senator Pell),
20 U.S.C. § 1070a(a) (1982); Supplementary Education Opportunity Grants ("SEOGs"), 20
U.S.C. § 1070b(a) (1982); Work-Study Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 2753(a) (1982); National Direct
Student Loan Program ("NDSLs"), 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa (a) (1982); and Guaranteed Student
Loans., ("GSLs"), 20 U.S.C. § 1077(a) (1982). While SEOGs and Work-Study Grants were
not at issue in Grove City because the College does not participate in the programs, they may
be much the same as BEOGs for title IX purposes. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Hillsdale
College, at 13-14 & asterisk, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984). One difference
pertaining to work-study is discussed later. See tmfra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
Pell Grants were established by the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1070 (1982), for the purpose of subsidizing tuition, fees, and certain costs of attendance for
people pursuing an undergraduate degree. The undergraduate institution, using standard
criteria, may compute the amount to be paid a student and distribute the money to him or
her, or, at the election of the institution, the Department of Education may perform these
tasks. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 690.78(a), with § 690.74. The institution is responsible for certify-
ing, among other things, that the student meets initial eligibility requirements for a grant and
makes continuing satisfactory progress in the educational program. 34 C.F.R. § 690.4; see id.
at §§ 690.75, 690.77, 690.78(c), 690.83, 690.94-.96.
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that Congress intended institution wide enforcement under a direct ex-
penditure theory in appropriate circumstances. The fundamental pur-
pose of the anti-discrimination statutes is "to avoid the use of federal
resources to 'support' discriminatory practices." 6 "Support," as com-
monly understood, means providing money. By their terms the first two
clauses of the statutes prohibit using federal funds if a person would "be
excluded from participation in [or] be denied the benefits of. . . any
• . . program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." These
clauses refer to persons who "directly participate in federal programs or
who directly benefit from the programs or who directly benefit from
federal grants, loans or contracts. . .. "" Only the third prohibitory
clause of the statutes, barring discrimination "under any . . . program
or activity," focuses on the program in which the protected person par-
ticipates rather than on the person. Under the first two clauses, the pro-
hibited act is discrimination in the use of federal funds spent directly on
a person.
The direct expenditure nexus has a close analogy in cases in which
discrimination has been barred within the walls of a building built with
federal construction funds."8 The nexus between the federal subsidy for
a building and the discrimination within appears to be more metaphysi-
cal than direct: How are the bricks and boards of a building relevant to
what occurs inside? Courts that have considered the nexus between a
building and the discriminatory habits of its residents have not articu-
lated precisely why the nexus is sufficient,3 9 but one can discern in these
cases the unquestioning assumption that the program and activity lan-
guage of the anti-discrimination statutes is by necessity expansive
enough to prohibit discrimination inside the walls of federally financed
buildings.40
36. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
37. 456 U.S. at 520-21.
38. University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 331 (E.D. Va. 1982). Accord Simp-
son v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F.
Supp. 531, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affdper curiam, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982); Stewart v. New
York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. Flanagan v. President and Directors,
417 F. Supp. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1976) (acceptance of Federal financial assistance for construc-
tion brings defendants' actions within purview of title VI.) But cf. Bennett v. West Tex. State
Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 80-81 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd'n unpub'dop., No. 81-1398 (5th Cir. Jan.
31, 1983),cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3701 (March 27, 1984) (receipt of indirect Federal aid and
Federal construction funds does not trigger title IX).
39. See cases cited supra note 38.
40. Cf President and Directors, 417 F. Supp. at 384 (accepting construction funds obligates
university to pursue non-discriminatory policies). The "inside the walls" predicate for the
protection is quite mechanical. In one case, title IX was held not to apply to a law school
where the federal funding went to build a dormitory next door to house law students. New
York Unv. , 430 F. Supp. at 1314. Even though the two buildings served the same educational
1984]
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One reason that the nexus is sufficient is that, just as a person is
entitled to an expectation of privacy that will be protected under the
fourth amendment,4 ' a potential victim of discrimination is entitled to
an expectation of safety within the walls of a federally funded building.
The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment establishes an
expectation of privacy when an individual is in a place that he reason-
ably believes is private: a bookmaker who is using a private phone
booth has a reasonable expectation that his conversation will not be
overheard by the government. Similarly, when in a building that was
built with the government's aid, an individual has a reasonable expecta-
tion that he will not be subjected to discrimination. Although this ex-
pectation may not be constitutionally protected, the civil rights statutes
give it effect. Because anyone entering the doors of the federally subsi-
dized building is entitled to a reasonable expectation of non-discrimina-
tory treatment, federal funding for a building can be considered a direct
expenditure on every program and activity occurring under the build-
ing's roof. The same "directness" exists in the connection between a
federally subsidized student and any program or activity in which he or
she participates in the educational institution. A federally subsidized
student has a reasonable expectation of safety that is protectable with
respect to any program or activity, so institution-wide enforcement of
the civil rights statutes is needed to ensure that the expectation is real-
ized. The institution becomes, in essence, the equivalent of a federally
protected building.
The direct expenditure nexus suggested in North Haven implies that
discrimination occurring anywhere in an educational institution is
barred by title IX if a federally subsidized student, who has an expecta-
tion of safety in the institution, will be subjected to or affected by the
discrimination. Once an educational institution accepts a federally sub-
sidized student and is paid the federally subsidized tuition fees, it is obli-
curriculum and student body, federal funding for the dormitory was an adequate basis for
protecting residents from discrimination only within dormitory walls and not for protecting
the same residents from the same discrimination next door. See Note, The Application of Title
IXto School Athletic Programs, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 222, 233 (1983).
What is intriguing about the notion of a "direct" connection between federal con-
struction funds and discrimination occurring inside the building is that the construction funds
are not used to pay for the operation of the programs housed inside. None of these federal
dollars is used "directly" to pay the salary of an employee who is suffering from discrimina-
tion or even the salary of the employee performing discriminatory acts. The building subsidy
may well subsidize the programs housed within by providing them with less expensive hous-
ing or by relieving the program of the need to seek building funds from other sources, such as
private donors or the commercial market. The program is then free to seek funds from the
same private donors for other purposes and to use the money it would have paid in interest
for a commercial loan on other activities.
41. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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gated not to discriminate against the student. Because the student
usually is free to participate in all programs within the institution, effec-
tive assurance against discrimination is impossible unless discriminatory
acts are banned everywhere in the institution. Thus, under North Haven,
the nexus between direct federal funding and a discriminatory act any-
where in the institution is sufficiently close to permit institution-wide
application of the civil rights statutes.
B. "Program" Equals Institution Nexus
Under the second nexus suggested by the North Haven Court, the
civil rights statutes apply if the complaining employee works in an edu-
cational program that receives federal assistance. 42 This nexus differs
from the direct expenditure nexus because it does not require that spe-
cific federal funds be spent directly on an identifiable payee. Instead,
the nexus requires only that the discrimination occur within the feder-
ally funded "program" in which the complainant participates or is em-
ployed. If a program constitutes the entire institution, discrimination
can be barred institution-wide. The critical question, therefore, is when
does an entire institution constitute a single program.43 The fact that an
institution or entity receives unrestricted funds that are or can be spent
throughout its budget makes it a candiate for consideration for institu-
tion-wide coverage.44
The first noteworthy case to equate the "program" with the institu-
42. 456 U.S. at 540.
43. The courts and commentators have posited several definitions of the term "program."
For a discussion of these theories see Note, supra note 5, at 1211-17 (arguing that the enforce-
ment section of title IX limits the scope of the term "program"); Note, Title IX of the 1972
Education Amendments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language With Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1060 (1983) (This article argues that a broad, integrated institution
approach "gives meaning to the [statutory] language [and] also adequately guards against the
harm that [the statute] was intended to prevent." Although this article discusses various theo-
ries, its concern is not to examine them in detail.).
44. A related question is the degree of title IX coverage that results when a categorical
grant is housed in an institution which is paid "a portion of the grant funds as reimbursement
for its overhead expenses. A categorical grant appears on its surface to be a program with
boundaries smaller than the institution in which it is housed. The Haffer court suggested,
however, that where the total amount of money so received by an institution is substantial,
the entire institution can be considered the program. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp.
531, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afdper curium, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982). Furthermore, the over-
head may contribute directly to the general fisc just as do tuition and fee payments. See Iron
Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549, 561-62 n.22 (5th Cir.), vacatedas moot, 458 U.S.
1102 (1983); Brief Amicus Curiae of American Association of University Women, et al., at 28,
n.34, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984). Finally, while the grant may be
administered according to nondiscriminatory policies, it is not free of discrimination if it is
housed within a discriminatory environment that effectively precludes protected minorities
from participating in the grant program. See infa notes 65-75 and accompanying text. In all
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tion because the federal funding was general and unrestricted was Bob
Jones Unversity v. Johnson," in which students used GI Bill education
benefits to pay tuition and fees. The court held that title VI prohibited
the University's discriminatory admissions policies because the entire in-
stitution was covered. As the court put it, the institution was the pro-
gram in which the veteran was participating, because the veteran's
enrollment in the entire University was the necessary prerequisite to the
payment of the education benefits; no smaller unit was offered for ad-
mission or enrollment by the University, so no smaller unit would be
covered.46
Following the Bob Jones analysis, the Third Circuit interpreted
broadly the reach of the civil rights statutes.4 7 In Grove Ciy v. Bell,4 8 the
court held that for an entire institution to be covered by title IX, the
institution must receive some form of general federal funding that can
be and is used throughout the institution. It found federal student
assistance in the form of BEOGs to be such funding. The court also
held that the institution must meet the further requirement of being
"integrated."4 9 The entire institution must be funded out of a single
of these circumstances, title IX would be applicable under North Haven both to the categorical
grant program and to the institution in which it is housed.
By drawing a sharp contrast between earmarked grants on the one hand and un-
restricted grants on the other, the Grove City decision suggests in dicta that categorical grants
can be the predicate solely for limited application of the civil rights statutes. 104 S. Ct. at
1220-1222. The Court had before it, however, no evidence as to the purposes of particular
categorical grant programs or their actual or intended effect on the recipient institution, so it
cannot be concluded finally that no categorical grant program can result in institution-wide
civil rights coverage. A further question is raised by Temple Univ. Where an institution re-
ceives a large percentage of its budget from numerous earmarked grants, no one of which has
an institution-wide purpose and effect, does the cumulative effect of the federal grant pres-
ence mandate institution-wide coverage? The answer may turn on the distinction between
actual effect and intended effect. The Grove City decision found that the latter is determina-
tive in the use of BEOGs. The answer in the case of other statutes is not likely to be different.
It has been suggested that categorical grants may be the basis for subjecting the entire
institution to title IX because the entire institution benefits from the grant insofar as funds
are thereby freed for use by other programs. Where a categorical grant program includes a
"maintenance of effort" clause, however, this approach may not be persuasive. Cf. Note,
supra note 40, at 232; Comment, HEWs Regulation Under Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 133, 183. It is unclear, however, what the
result would be if there were evidence that the clause is honored in the breach.
45. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1974).
46. See id. at 602; Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 12, at 170 n.47. Compare Note, supra note
40, at 226, with Skilton, The Emergent Law of Women and Amateur Sports: Recent Developments, 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1701, 1725-27 (1982).
47. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 697 (3d Cir. 1982), aJ'don other grounds, 104
S. Ct. 1211 (1984); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd per
curium, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
48. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982), af'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
49. Id. at 698-99.
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pool of funds, and the students must be free to engage in all the activi-
ties offered by the college.5"
An integrated institution like that found in Grove City frequently has
another important characteristic: a hierarchical decision-making struc-
ture with uniformly applicable, institution-wide policies and practices.
One court, for example, found that university policies that were based
on instructions from the president's office governed an athletic depart-
ment's rejection of a handicapped athlete.5 Although no federal fund-
ing was earmarked for the athletic department, the department was
subject to university direction and was not separate from its governance
structure.52 Based on this chain of command, the court held that the
athletic department was subject to section 504.
In an integrated institution, discrimination may reveal itself in the
policies and practices relating to faculty, staff, transportation, extracur-
ricular activities, or facilities.5 3 The policies and practices affecting each
element flow from the same source: the school board or governing body
of the institution. Accordingly, discrimination in any one area may indi-
cate that discrimination is occurring throughout the integrated system.
Wherever it occurs, therefore, the discrimination must be remedied to
assure that the federal funds are not spent in a similarly discriminatory
manner.
Another factor that a court may consider when determining the
scope of title IX is that students are essentially fungible. That is, all
students are permitted access to all parts of an institution, and students'
needs can be met only by an integrated administrative structure with
uniform rules for all of the institution's subunits. An employee's ineligi-
bility for his employer's only federally funded program led one court to
hold that the employee had not shown a sufficient connection between
the federal funding and the alleged discrimination. In Szmpson v. Reynolds
50. See id. at 696-97. The court concluded that no "Chinese wall" exists between any of
the college's programs and activities and any other program and activity. It leaves open the
possibility that a defendant institution. may prove the existence of a Chinese wall, however,
and implies that such a separate program or activity would not be considered an integrated
part of the institution. Id. at 701 n.28. The Chinese wall would, in the contemplation of the
Third Circuit, consist of a fiscal separation between the discrimination and the federally
funded program. Where the financial separation is less than complete, the Chinese wall
would not serve to insulate a program from the requirements of title IX.
51. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
52. Id. at 792; see Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1977),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951
(1980); Yakin v. Univeristy of Ill., Chicago Circle Campus, 508 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
53. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United States
v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), afden banc, 380 F.2d 385, cerl. denied sub nor. United States v.
Caddo Parish School Bd., 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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Metal Co.,54 a business was accused of discrimination against an alco-
holic employee. The only federal funding that the company received
was for a veteran's apprenticeship program for which the complaining
employee was ineligible to participate and in which he had never ex-
pressed a desire to participate.5 5 The court found that although section
504 applied to the apprenticeship program, there was no adequate
nexus between the program and the complaining employee because the
business was not a "unified entity. '"56 An educational establishment is
different, the court said, because a student may seek "to participate in a
privately funded program conducted in conjunction with an educa-
tional institution's overall program, other parts of which [are] federally
funded."'57 By denying the student participation in the privately funded
activity, the institution denies the student participation in the overall
program.5 8 An employee who is employed in a discrete, privately
funded section of a business and who is ineligible for the publicly funded
program does not connect the privately funded program to the publicly
funded program, because the policies and practices of the one do not
overlap the other. The employer's alleged discrimination in the private
program, therefore, is not connected through the employee to the pub-
licly funded program in which such discrimination is barred.
When attempting to parse a program from its context, courts have
employed a similar functional analysis of the budgetary structure of the
parent institution. Courts have focused, for example, on such matters as
the existence of a general fund.59 If the federal funds flow through a
general fund, the entire institution is more likely to be found subject to
title IX. 60  When the federal funds are provided to several different
types of narrow-focus programs under different budget processes and
different governing bodies, on the other hand, it is more likely that each
program will be evaluated separately for civil rights purposes.61
54. Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
55. Id. at 1231.
56. Id. at 1232.
57. Id. at 1233 n.12.
58. Id. (discussing Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978));
Flanagan v. President and Directors, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976).
59. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 213 (D.N.H. 1981);see Comment,supra note 44,
at 177-78.
60. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. at 213; see Temple Univ., 688 F.2d at 17; Grove City, 687 F.2d at
700; Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments. Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public
Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103, 112 n.60 (1974). But see Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F.
Supp. 1376, 1389 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Kuhn, supra note 32, at 71.
61. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 128 (7th Cir. 1972); cf. id. at 137-38
(Sprecher, J., dissenting); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1075 (5th Cir.
1969) (title VI requires case-by-case analysis before cutting funds).
The First Circuit's decision in Rice is another example. Rice v. President and Fellows,
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Because of their typically unified governance, budgetary, and ad-
ministrative structures, and because students are permitted universal ac-
cess to programs, the majority of educational institutions are integrated.
The Third Circuit in Grove City justifiably found that title IX is enforce-
able throughout an integrated institution receiving unrestricted funds.
Subdivided enforcement would permit an institution to use its inte-
grated governance and budgetary structures to shift federal funds to
those programs in which no discrimination occurs and thus insulate con-
tinued discrimination in other programs.6 2 Students who are subject to
a single set of educational and administrative policies and practices in
every other aspect of campus life would face varying degrees of exposure
663 F.2d 336 (lst Cir. 1981),cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982). The student complaining of sex
discrimination in the grading policies of the Harvard Law School alleged that federal funding
was received by the school for work-study students, but she did not allege that the discrimina-
tion occurred in the work-study program. Id. at 339. The Court held that only the work-
study program was subject to the anti-discrimination statutes. The result is correct under the
program-equals-institution nexus theory because of the lack of allegations showing defendant
law school's integrated characteristics. Under the direct expenditure nexus theory, the result
is debatable because it effectively unties the work-study program from its moorings. As dis-
cussed earlier, the first nexus described in North Haven means that title IX covers discrimina-
tion against recipients of work-study grants just as it would against any other employee paid
with federal funds. In a pure employment setting, discriminatory policies governing the eval-
uation of a federally funded employee without question would be prohibited. It is at least
arguable, therefore, that an institution distributing work-study grants to its students must
adopt non-discriminatory grading or evaluation policies to eliminate the possibility that the
federally funded employee, ie., the work-study student, will be victimized by discriminatory
grading, and as a result, lose her or his status as a student/employee. See supra notes 33-41
and accompanying text.
62. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981); cf. Brief for Re-
spondent at 103-05 & n.76, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984).
The impracticality of applying title IX to subdivided parts of an educational, busi-
ness, or governmental institution also suggests that Congress did not intend that result. Such
was the testimony of Representative Mink during the Postsecondary Hearings:
It is difficult to trace the Federal dollar precisely. A narrow interpretation
of title IX would render the law meaningless and virtually impossible either to en-
force or to administer. For example, the slide projector in one classroom might be
purchased with title I ESEA money, while the slide projector in the adjacent room
was not. It surely is not the intent of Congress to prohibit sex--or race or national
origin--discrimination in the room with the title I projector, while allowing it in the
adjacent room. Surely we do not want HEW investigators to be charged with trac-
ing exactly which classes used the federally funded slide projector.
Also, if this narrow interpretation of the scope of coverage were accepted for
title IX, it might well be the wedge in the door for cutting back protection of racial
and ethnic minorities under title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Such a narrow
interpretation could open the floodgates for reversing 11 years of progress under title
VI.
Sex Discrimination Regulations.- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1975) (statement of Representative
Mink); see id. at 198 (statement of Representative McKinney); Wright v. Columbia Univ.,
520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Note, supra note 40, at 231.
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to discrimination based solely on the institution's bookkeeping decisions.




Under the third nexus described in North Haven, title IX, title VI,
and section 504 bar discrimination occurring in a non-federally funded
program when the discrimination affects a federally funded programf.'
The theory differs markedly from the direct-expenditure nexus theory
and the program-equals-institution nexus theory because it does not re-
quire that an institution receive unrestricted federal funding. What is
required instead is the existence within an institution of a federally
funded program that is affected by discrimination occurring elsewhere in
the institution. This third nexus theory, termed the "infection" theory,
has proved to be the most common approach taken by courts that have
held the anti-discrimination statutes applicable to a program that re-
ceives no earmarked federal funds.6 5 Under the theory, an institution
enrolling students receiving federal financial aid is subject in its entirety
to the civil rights statutes for the purpose of eliminating any discrimina-
tion that adversely affects the federally funded student aid program.
The "infection" theory derives from the decision in Board of Pubhc Instruc-
tion v. Finch ,66 in which the court said:
In finding that . . . the Civil Rights Act [applies] on a pro-
gram by program basis, we do not mean to indicate that a
program must be considered in isolation from its context ...
63. During the debate on title VI, one of the bill's sponsors, Senator Humphrey, de-
scribed the effect of the program-specific limitation on the funding cutoff sanction that was
adopted because of congressional concern that an unlimited sanction would give federal civil
rights enforcers too great a sanction. He said that the program or activity language was not
to be read as
authoriz[ing] any cutoff or limitation of highway funds, for example, by reason of
school segregation. And it does not authorize a cutoff, or other compliance action,
on a statewide basis unless the State itself is engaging in discrimination on a state-
wide basis. For example, in the case of grants to impacted area schools, separate
compliance action would have to be taken with respect to each school district receiv-
ing a grant.
110 CONG. REC. 6,544 (1964).
It should be noted that the smallest unit mentioned by Senator Humphrey is a school
district, not an individual school. The sensible analogy is to the entire body of an integrated
educational institution. Typical school districts and integrated educational institutions share
the critical characteristics: a single set of educational and administrative policies, a hierarchi-
cal governance structure, a unified budgetary process, and an essentially fungible student
body. There are no important distinctions.
64. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 540.
65. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
66. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
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[It applies where either] a particular program is itself adminis-
tered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by
dicriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system that it
thereby becomes discriminatory.6 7
Under the infection theory, institution-wide enforcement of the
civil rights statutes is required if the facts show that the federally funded
program cannot be "cured" of discrimination unless the entire institu-
tion is "cured." The case of the Iron Arrow Honor Society demonstrates
how this works.' Prior to the initiation of title IX enforcement proceed-
ings, the all-male society, which was funded exclusively by private
funds, occupied a unique and prominent role in the life of the Univer-
sity of Florida. Created by the University's first president, the society
possessed a unique university charter and counted among its members
alumni, staff, faculty members, and administrators of the university.
Faculty members served on its membership screening committee;
plaques and monuments on campus honored the society and its contri-
butions to university life. Public recognition of members was promoted
by, among other things, a public induction ceremony held during class
hours on a mound on the campus. 69
The court found that, in light of the University's close involvement
with the activities of, and its public affirmations of support for, the soci-
ety, the society's male-only policy pervasively undermined the self-worth
of women participating in the University's programs.7 ° Because of its
close ties with the society, the University was endorsing the message
that, solely because of her sex, a female student's ideas and value in the
university community were less significant than those of a male student.
Thus the court found that the University could be required under title
IX to sever its ties with the society because the society's exclusion of
women affected the federally funded programs by maintaining an envi-
ronment of sexual discrimination.7 t
A frequently cited source of discriminatory infection is the educa-
tional athletic program. The Supreme Court has recognized that athlet-
ics are a vital part of the total educational process. 72 The policy of the
67. Id. at 1078.
68. Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 458 U.S.
1102 (1983).
69. Id. at 562-64.
70. Id. at 561.
71. Id. at 562-64.
72. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971); see Note, Sex
Discrinination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOwA L. REv. 420, 468-69 (1975); Comment, Sex




National Collegiate Athletic Association is that athletic programs are to
be "an integral part of the educational program,' 73 a policy which finds
expression in the faculty status accorded coaches and the academic
credit awarded for athletic courses. The public honor accorded athletes
who perform well in the competitive athletic endeavors of their schools
is well known. If an institution prevents women from fully participating
in these athletic events, the institution is endorsing the same message
that is sent by the males-only policy of the Iron Arrow Society: Only
men are good enough to be honored in this university community. That
message can act as a surface indicator of sex discrimination occurring in
other programs of the university, just as discrimination in athletics has
been found to act as a surface indicator of race discrimination occurring
in other programs of a school system.7 4 In addition, discrimination in a
public activity, such as athletics, infects other activities throughout the
university, because other members of the university community will per-
ceive discrimination as acceptable behavior that has the approval of
university officials. A person inclined to discriminate, therefore, would
experience no inhibition, while a person needing protection will perceive
that none is provided. Discrimination in a public activity such as athlet-
ics, therefore, is good evidence that a federally funded program, such as
student aid, is operating in a discriminatory environment. Participants
in the federal program can be protected only if the discrimination in
athletics is eliminated.
Sub silentio, the infection theory has been relied on frequently as
the basis for application of the anti-discrimination statutes.75 In Lau v.
Nichols ,76 for example, the Supreme Court held that when a school dis-
trict receives large amounts of federal financial assistance, the school dis-
trict's failure to provide bilingual education violates Title VI. Although
the federally funded programs were not earmarked to assist students
needing bilingual education, they were the basis for invoking title VI
73. Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 12, at 170-71 & n.49.
74. Charloue-Mecklenburg Bd of Edut., 402 U.S. at 18; see Gaal & DiLorenzo, supra note 12
at 172.
75. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974); Iron Arrow Honor Socy, 702 F.2d at
562; Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) (her cunam); Grove City College v.
Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir.), aJ'd, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984); New York State Assoc. for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979); Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801, 803-04
(4th Cir. 197 7),cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d
847, 850 (5th Cir. 1967); Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.N.J.
1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. El Camino
Community College Dist., 454 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (C.D. Cal. 1978), afd, 600 F.2d 1258 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635,
637 (D.S.C. 1977).
76. 414 U.S. 563, 566-68 (1974).
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because the discrimination against the non-English speaking students
prevented them from participating in the federally funded programs.
Thus the discrimination pervaded or infected the federally funded pro-
grams.77 The infection theory also has been the basis for findings that
discrimination in extracurricular programs, such as athletics and school
trips, can be barred because of its effect on federally funded programs
conducted by the institution or school system.
7 8
In recent years, two courts have attempted to circumscribe the in-
fection theory. Both concluded that the theory is inapplicable under
title IX.7 9 Although the infection theory may be applicable under title
VI because of its constitutional underpinning, these courts assert, it is
inapplicable under title IX, which is a mere statutory bar to discrimina-
tion. 0 These courts also argue that the infection theory is used properly
only to ensure that educational institutions do not discriminatorily deny
students access to federally funded programs. Thus, title IX or section
504 would not apply if discrimination in a program that does not re-
ceive earmarked funds, such as athletics, affects an entire institution or
any other federally funded program within the institution, because the
77. Id ; see also, Riles, 495 F. Supp. at 964 (California State Board of Education and San
Francisco Board of Education ordered to remedy system-wide discrimination against the edu-
cable mentally retarded; title IX and section 504 applicable because of "substantial federal
assistance" received by the defendants); New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children, 612 F.2d at
649 (New York City Board of Education ordered to remedy discrimination against mentally
retarded children; section 504 "fully applicable" because defendant receives federal funds);
Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 604 (D.S.C. 1974) (college's students' VA
educational benefits cut off under title VI because of discrimination against blacks in admis-
sion); cf. Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967) (black children on
Air Force base may attend integrated public schools because defendant school board received
federal funds).
78. See, e.g., Iron Arrow Honor Socv, 702 F.2d at 561 (discrimination in honorary society
barred where university receives federal assistance); Uzzell, 547 F.2d at 802 (discrimination in
university's administration of campus governing council and honor board barred where uni-
versity receives federal financial assistance in the form of grants and contracts); United States
v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1971) (desegregation ordered under title VI in extracur-
ricular as well as academic program); South Plainfield Bd of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951
(D.N.J. 1980) (section 504 applies to interscholastic sports program if school system receives
federal funds).
79. Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor
School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1982), afdon other grounds , 699 F.2d 309 (6th
Cir. 1983). Othen is discussed solely to illustrate the arguments surrounding the infection
theory, and not as authority. The district court decision was affirmed on the ground that the
plaintiff did not prevail; the Court of Appeals determined that it was not necessary for the
district court to have decided whether title IX applies to the athletic programs of the defend-
ant school district. Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 699 F.2d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 1983).
80. Hillsdale College, 696 F.2d at 429; Othen, 507 F. Supp. at 1388-89; see also University of
Richmond, 543 F. Supp. at 328.
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The explicit language in North Haven and the facts of Finch provide
persuasive responses to both these arguments. In North Haven, the
Supreme Court approved the Fch court's use of the infection theory as
a standard for the application of title IX-irrespective of the place of
women in the constitution.8 2 Furthermore, by its terms the discrimina-
tion bar of title IX is not limited to admissions; it extends to any action
by which a person is "excluded from participation in," "subjected to
discrimination under," or "denied the benefits of" an educational pro-
gram or activity receiving federal financial assistance.83 Nothing in the
identical statutory language of title IX, title VI, and section 504 suggests
that an admissions program should be subjected to more stringent re-
quirements than any other aspect of an educational institution. 4
The Fich facts also belie the notion that admissions are to be
treated more stringently. In Fnch, the Taylor County School system
received categorical grants for a variety of school services. The court
found that funding could not be terminated for any program unless dis-
crimination occurred within the specific program proposed for funding
termination or unless discrimination outside the program affected the
program.8 5 The court did not suggest that the extra-program discrimi-
nation must be a discriminatory entry barrier. 6
II. GROVE CITY COLLEGE v BELL
Institution-wide enforcement of the civil rights laws is an effective
way for the government to assist protected minorities to achieve equal-
ity. Although the North Haven decision raised doubts about the future of
institution-wide enforcement, the program-specificity requirement of
the civil rights statutes need not be a substantial bar. Under the three
nexus theories suggested in North Haven, institution-wide enforcement
would be permissible if unrestricted federal funding may be spent
81. Hillsdale College, 696 F.2d at 429; Othen, 507 F. Supp. at 1388-89; see Kuhn, supra note
32, at 63 n.89, 70;see also Rice v. President and Fellows, 663 F.2d 336, 339 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. dented, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va.
1982); Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 81 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd in unpub'd
op., No. 81-1398 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3701 (March 27, 1984).
82. 456 U.S. at 538-39. The Court supported its position by reiterating that Congress
intended that title IX be interpreted consistently with title VI. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
84. See Iron Arrow Honor Socy, 702 F.2d at 556.
85. 414 F.2d at 1078.
86. Such limitation would be inconsistent with the infection theory-to ensure that feder-
ally funded programs can operate in a discrimination free environment. See Comment, supra
note 60, at 112.
[VOL. 43:379
TOUCHDOWN OR TOUCHBACK
throughout an integrated institution, if federal funds are paid to or for
the benefit of a potential victim of discrimination for the purpose of
participation in all of a recipient institution's or entity's programs, or if
a federally funded program is affected by discrimination occurring in a
non-federally funded program elsewhere in an institution or entity. In
its decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 7 however, the Court adopted a
"purpose and effect" test that will bar in large measure the institution-
wide enforcement effects permissible under North Haven.
,4. The Purpose and Efect Test
The Court's new test can be stated quite simply: If the purpose and
effect of federal funding is to assist a particular program, the civil rights
statutes may be invoked to bar discrimination in that program. 8 Ap-
plying the test to Grove City College, the Court found that discrimina-
tion in the financial aid program could be barred, but the rest of the
college was not subject to the anti-discrimination statutes.
Grove City is a small, coeducational liberal arts college that re-
ceives federal funds only in the form of federal aid to students.8 9 As a
matter of policy, the college did not apply for federal funding because of
its traditional commitment to independence from the government. 9 0
When HEW began the title IX enforcement action, one hundred forty
of the school's approximately twenty-two hundred students were eligible
to receive BEOGs and three hundred forty-two students had obtained
Guaranteed Student Loans (GSLs).9 '
In 1976, HEW asked the college to sign an Assurance of Compli-
ance form in which the college would promise to comply in all of its
programs with title IX.92 Claiming that it was not subject to title IX
because it received no federal financial assistance, the college refused to
sign.93 An administrative law judge concluded that the college was a
"recipient" of "federal financial assistance" and allowed HEW to termi-
nate the BEOGs and GSLs.9 4 The college and four student recipients of
financial aid sued the Department to declare the termination void and
to enjoin the Department from requiring the college to sign an Assur-
ance of Compliance as a condition of preserving its eligibility for the
87. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
88. Id. at 1222.
89. Id. at 1214.
90. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 688-89 n.7.
91. Id. at 688.





BEOG and GSL programs. 95 Although the district court rejected the
college's argument that BEOGs and GSLs do not constitute "federal
financial assistance," it refused to allow HEW to terminate the BEOGs
and GSLs based on the college's refusal to sign an Assurance of Compli-
ance.9 6 Partially reversing the district court, the court of appeals held
that the phrase "federal financial assistance" includes educational
grants (BEOGs), but not loans (GSLs), paid to students. 97 Thus, institu-
tions that receive aid only "indirectly," that is, through students' tuition,
are within the purview of title IX.9  The court also interpreted the
"program-specific" language of title IX, "program or activity," to mean
that when students receive federal student aid, the entire college consti-
tutes the "program" covered by title IX.99
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Grove Cy, the government
shifted its position on the scope of title IX coverage. The government
continued to argue that admitting students who receive federal financial
aid subjects a college to title IX, ' ° but it abandoned its traditional posi-
tion that the entire college is covered. It argued that title IX applies
only to the financial aid program of the college; 0 ' discrimination in
another part of the college generally cannot be prohibited if the college
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. No appeal was taken with respect to the GSLs. Id. at 690 n.10.
98. Id. at 693.
99. Id. at 697-700.
100. Brief for Respondent, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
101. Id. at 13-18; Post-Argument Brief for Respondent, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.
Ct. 1211 (1984). Contrary to the consistent positions taken by HEW and DOE in the title IX
regulations, earlier stages of the case, and other title IX litigation, the government argued
that the coverage of title IX should be resolved "by a common sense discernment of what, in
the most natural way, can be considered the educational 'program or activity' assisted by
federal aid." Id. at 15-16. It asserted that its position is mandated by the "explicit direction
in North Haven that [the title IX regulations] not be given . . . universal application." Id. at
15. Instead, the coverage should be limited to the financial aid program. Id. at 16.
Senator Dole described the government's position as a "legalistic, technical interpre-
tation." The Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1983, at A5, col. 1; see id., Aug. 3, 1983, at A2, col. 1
(statement of Representative Schneider); id., Aug. 6, 1983, at A2, col. 1. Seventy-four mem-
bers of Congress, including Representative Schneider and Senator Dole, filed a brief amicus
curiae in the Grove City case urging the Court to interpret title IX coverage comprehensively
in accordance with the intent of Congress. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Honorable Claudine
Schneider, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984). All of the amici are co-sponsors
of one of two identical bills, S. 149, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and H.R. 190, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), which reaffirm the congressional intention that title IX and the initial regula-
tions issued pursuant to it "should not be amended or altered in any manner which will lessen
the comprehensive coverage of such statute in eliminating gender discrimination throughout
the American educational system." 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H10085 (daily ed.
Nov. 16, 1983). H.R. 190, which is co-sponsored by 225 members of the House of Representa-
tives, was reported favorably to the House by the Education and Labor Committee on Au-
gust 5, 1983 and passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 414 to 9.
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receives only indirect financial aid. The effect of the government's inter-
pretation of the term "program or activity" is to limit the coverage of
title IX to the particular aspect of the institution that the relevant fund-
ing statute was designed to benefit. Because Congress intended that the
BEOG program subsidize the financial aid programs of institutions of
higher education, the government argued, only the financial aid pro-
gram is covered by title IX.102
The Court found that title IX applies to Grove City College be-
cause it admits students who participate in the BEOG program.'0 3 The
102. Initially, the government cited no authority for its argument, asserting instead that
"[t]he purpose of the program is specific and well-recognized: it enables schools to recruit
students who otherwise could not afford to attend." The Post-Argument Memorandum con-
tained a slightly fuller explanation:
By contrast, when the government gives an institution BEOGs (to hand out under
the RDS system), those funds are restricted in the sense that the school must use them
for scholarships-that is, for recruiting students regardless of means. The funds are
intended to be, and have the economic effect of providing, a subsidy to Grove City's
financial aid and scholarship program. (The situation is no different when BEOGs
are handed out under the ADS system. The funds are again used for the purpose of
recruiting to the school the most desirable students; the government simply relieves
the school of the administrative burden of dispensing the money.)
Post-Argument Memorandum in Support of Federal Respondents' Motion to File Memoran-
dum at 3, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
103. Grove Cty, 104 S. Ct. at 1220. The "trigger" question turned on whether the Depart-
ment of Education's title IX interpretive regulations correctly define two statutory terms.
Under these regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106. 2 (g)(1) (1983), the term "federal financial assist-
ance" is defined as including aid for education, whether payable to the student or the institu-
tion. The term "recipient" is defined as an institution "to whom Federal financial assistance
is extended directly or through another recipient." 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1983). When read
together, a college such as Grove City is a recipient covered by title IX's bar against sex
discrimination because some of its students receive BEOGs which they use to pay tuition and
fees to the college.
The arguments favoring the correctness of the inclusive interpretive regulations are
quite strong. First, their interpretation is not precluded by the language of the statute, a
factor to which the Supreme Court gave substantial weight when interpreting title IX in
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521-22 (1982). Second, the legislative history
supports the inclusive interpretation. The most prominent contemporary forms of federal
student aid either originated in or were amended by the Education Amendments of 1972,
which also contained title IX. See Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 325; Conference Rep. No. 798,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess.passbn (1972). The debates on the Amendments demonstrate that Con-
gress was aware that title IX properly could be invoked when a higher education institution
accepted students receiving aid under the other titles of the same Amendments. See, e.g., 113
CONG. REC. 30,158-59 (1971) (remarks of Sen. McGovern); 117 CONG. REC. 30,155-56,
30,408 and 30,412 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117 CONG. REC. 39,255 (remarks of Rep.
Cleveland); 117 CONG. REC. 39,257 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
In addition to the concurrent consideration of title IX and student aid, further evi-
dence of congressional intent is found in title IV of the Education Amendments of 1972,
relating to the Student Loan Marketing Association. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 266
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2 (1982)). Unlike the other titles, title IV applies to
private lending institutions rather than to educational institutions. It is worthy to note that,
although title IV contains a specific prohibition against gender discrimination, none of the
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Court also agreed with the government's conclusion that the student
financial aid program is covered, but its rationale is somewhat differ-
ent.1 0 4 The "program" operated by a recipient is determined according
to the "purpose and effect" of the federal funding program, BEOGs.
According to the Court, the "purpose" of the BEOG program was re-
stricted to assisting colleges to give aid to poor students; it was not to
provide unrestricted assistance to the colleges. The "effect" of the
titles applicable to educational institutions contains such a specific prohibition. This is an
additional indication that Congress saw no need to include a specific prohibition against
gender discrimination in any part of the bill applicable to educational institutions, such as the
student financial aid programs, because it was assumed that title IX would apply.
The post-enactment history of title IX also lends weight to the Department's inclusive
regulatory interpretation. See North Haven, 456 U.S. at 535-37; Comment, supra note 44, at
152-53. The regulations were subject to a congressional review which, after extensive expla-
nations and discussion, resulted in no changes. Sex Discrination Regulations: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 481, 484 (1975) (statement of Secretary of HEW Weinberger) [hereinafter cited as Post-
secondary Hearngs]; id. at 488 (letter from Secretary of HEW Weinberger); see id. at 65 (state-
ment of Rep. Chisholm); id. at 163 (statement of Rep. Mink); see S. 2146, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 23,845-47 (1975) (statement of Senator Helms); H.R. Con. Res. 330,
121 CONG. REC. 21,687 (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 329, 121 CONG. REC. 21,687 (1975); H.R.
Con. Res. 310, 121 CONG. REC. 19,209 (1975); S. Con. Res. 46, 121 CONG. REC. 17,300
(1975).
Finally, in 1976 the Senate rejected the McClure Amendment, whose purpose was to
limit the applicability of title IX to institutions that receive federal funding "directly from the
federal government." Amend. 390, 122 CONG. REC. 28,144 (1976). The Senate was advised
during the debate that the inclusive interpretation had been upheld in the title VI case of Bob
Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), afdmem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir.
1975). Both Senator Bayh, the sponsor of title IX, and Senator Pell, the sponsor of the BEOG
program, argued that BobJones was correctly decided. 122 CONG. REC. 28,145, 28,147 (1976).
From the defeat of the amendment, it appears they were persuasive.
The major argument asserted against the inclusive regulatory interpretation of "re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance" is that the breadth of the interpretation alters the statu-
tory scheme by effectively eliminating the program-specific limitation of the statute. To
rephrase the argument in the words of the statute, if federal student aid is within the defini-
tion of "federal financial assistance," the "program or activity" "receiving" the assistance
logically is the entire educational institution to which the funds are paid. Therefore, the
argument proceeds, because title IX is intended to be enforced by the government only with
respect to a "program or activity" and not with respect to an entire educational institution,
the statutory scheme prohibits the initial step of finding that federal student aid constitutes
"Federal financial assistance." See University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 329
(E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 525 F. Supp. 77, 78 (N.D. Tex. 198 1),rev'd
in an unpub'd op., No. 81-1398 (5th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3701 (March
27, 1984); Brief for Petitioner at 19, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984); Brief
Amicus Curiae of Hillsdale College, Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984); Tash-
jian-Brown, Title IX. Progress Toward Program Specifi Regulation of Private Academia, 10 J.C. &
U.L. 1, 26 (1983-84). In light of the broad statutory language, the connection explicitly rec-
ognized by the enacting Congress between title IX and the student aid programs and the
clear post-enactment history, the argument is weak. Furthermore, it rests on an inaccurate
premise, that coverage of an entire institution is impermissible. See infra notes 111-114 and
accompanying text.
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1220-22.
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BEOG funding is also limited to the financial aid program; following
the federal dollars through the operating budget of the college to ensure
that the federally aided students always are protected from discrimina-
tion is not within the congressional intent. In addition, the effect is re-
stricted because the aid represents an increase in both the resources and
the obligations of the college. Student financial aid, in sum, is sui
generis and does not support institution-wide coverage of title IX.,
0 5
The Court's interpretation of the term "program and activity" is
not persuasive. The purpose and effect test, as it is explained and ap-
plied in Grove City, ignores substantial evidence of a more expansive con-
gressional intent with respect to both the BEOG program and the civil
rights statutes."0 6 It also ignores long-standing administrative interpre-
tations of title VI and title IX, which Congress has not overruled by
amending either act. 0 7 Without explanation, it accepts one congres-
sional purpose for the BEOG statute while ignoring another.'0 8 It deter-
mines the impact of the program on an educational institution without
evidence although evidence could have shown a quite different pic-
ture. ' 9 Finally, it permits scant and indecisive evidence of congres-
sional intent as to the "regulatory impact" of the BEOG program to
reduce substantially the scope of protection provided by the civil rights
statutes. 110
Congress spoke with unusual clarity about its intention in enacting
the BEOG program. The statute, as enacted, states five purposes: four
relate to a single goal, meeting certain financial needs of students. The
fifth, on the other hand, states that the grant program is to "provide
assistance to institutions of higher education."1 ' The House Report ex-
plained the relevance and importance of the fifth purpose:
Institutions of higher education have sought federal assist-
ance to enable them to meet their responsibilities to the nation.
The bill . . . attempts to meet that need both by extending
and amending existing categorical programs and accepting
105. Id. at 1221.
106. See infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
109. See infia notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a)(l)-(5)(1 9 82). An instructive contrast may be found in the Medi-
care enactment, which describes the purposes of the program solely in terms of benefiting the
people needing medical care. The language of the statute does not evidence a congressional
intention to benefit an entire institutional or non-institutional health care provider. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395c (1982). But see H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1965) (effect of
enacting Medicare-Medicaid programs would be to reduce the number of unpaid bills and
patients too poor to pay, so hospitals could reduce income deficits).
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new federal roles particularly in regard to the general support
of higher education institutions. 12
Among the two primary congressional purposes in creating BEOGs,
therefore, was assisting entire institutions of higher education, not just
the impecunious student.
The Court acknowledged the dual purposes of the BEOG program,
but chose, without explanation, to focus on the student aid purpose and
to dismiss the institution aid purpose. 13 As the Court put it,
The BEOG program was designed, not merely to increase the
total resources available to educational institutions, but to en-
able them to offer their services to students who had previously
been unable to afford higher education."14
The Court implied that its finding of a single purpose was justified be-
cause Congress envisioned that the effect of the program would be sin-
gular: to aid the impecunious student and not the institution. Quite
simply, the finding contradicts the evidence.
The effect side of the test is equally dubious. "Effect," as the Court
describes it, is not the actual impact or uses of the student aid, because
the "impact/effect" is as great on the institution as it is on the student.
For example, federal aid enables an institution to recruit students other-
wise unable to attend because of finances." 5 Recruitment often serves
goals that affect the school more than the student: schools may be inter-
ested in maintaining minimum student enrollment, creating a good
football team, or improving the quality of a graduate program. In addi-
tion, federal aid subsidizes the privately funded financial aid program of
an institution. Because of that subsidy, the institution may be able to
redirect its private fund-raising efforts to other needs, such as a li-
brary.1 16 Furtherm6re, the ultimate destination of the federal dollar is
neither the financial aid program of the institution nor the student's
pocket. Rather, the general fisc of the institution is funded with tuition
and fees paid by students, both with and without federal assistance. 1 7
Finally, the federal aid funds are not spent to operate or improve the
financial aid program." 8 Rather, the aid is spent for tuition, fees, and
112. H.R. REP. No. 554, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
113. 104 S. Ct. at 1221-22.
114. Id.
115. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 696; Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp at 540; BobJones Univ., 396 F.
Supp. at 603.
116. Grove Ciy, 687 F.2d at 696; Bob Jones Univ., 396 F. Supp. at 602; Temple Univ., 524 F.
Supp. at 540.
117. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 698.
118. The only exception to this general rule is that since 1977, educational institutions may
be paid $10.00 for each student receiving a BEOG, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a(d)(1) (1982), in order
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other education-related expenses. The federal dollar that enters the in-
stitution by way of tuition and fees is ultimately available for use by
most, if not all, the programs in the institution.119
Before Grove Ciy, determining what was within the scope of a fund-
ing statute meant looking for the "impact/effect" of the funds: the civil
rights statutes were enforceable wherever the "impact/effect" of the
funds was felt. 2 ° The role of Congress was to decide what a funding
program was to do, not how the civil rights statutes would be enforced
in each instance. The Grove City standard reverses this formula. The
civil rights statutes are enforceable only if Congress intends a funding
program to be subject to their regulatory force. Instead of measuring
the effect of the federal funding program by the actual impact or use of
the funds, the Grove City Court defines effect in terms of the degree of
regulation Congress intended to impose when it enacted the program. '2
Allowing congressional intent about the regulatory effect of a funding
statute to determine the measure of enforcement permitted under the
civil rights statutes fundamentally contradicts one of the major purposes
of enacting the civil rights statutes: to guarantee that civil rights protec-
tion automatically accompanies every Congressional funding pro-
gram. 22 Beginning with title VI, legislators have sought to avoid
raising the difficult issue of civil rights every time a new program was
proposed. Instead, they wished to settle the issue once in title VI, then
have it applied without further selectivity to all federal programs within
its scope. 23 The same was true for title IX and section 504.124
With respect to the BEOG program, the Grove City Court says that
congressional intent as to regulatory effect is evident from the program's
to defray the costs of providing information about and administering the program. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1088(b) (1982).
119. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 700; see Iron Arrow Honor Socy, 702 F.2d at 562 n.22; Hillsdale
College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 422 (6th Cir. 1982); Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. at 537-38; Bob
Jones Um'., 396 F.Supp. at 603 n.22.
120. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); 34 C.F.R. § 100.5 (1983); id. at 100.13(i);
id at 104.3(h); id. at 106.2(h).
121. 104 S. Ct. at 1222.
122. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2391, 2401; id. at 2434, 2453 (Minority Report); id. at 2512 (additional views of
Hon. McCulloch, Lindsay, Cahill, Shriver, McGregor, Mathias, and Bromwell); H.R. REP.
No. 554, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., reprited in, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2512; S.
REP. No. 318, 93d Cong. 1st Sess (1973), 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2143.
123. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7062 (1964) (statement of Senator Pastore); id. at 7065
(statement of Senator Ribicof); id. at 2467 (statement of Rep. Lindsay); id. at 2467-68 (state-
ment of Rep. Celler); id. at 2468 (statement of Rep. Rodino); id at 2480-82 (1964) (statement
of Rep. Ryan).
124. 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 119 CONG. REc. 24,569 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Cranston).
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economic structure: it increases both the obligations and the resources
of the recipient institution.12 5 Under this quid pro quo system, students
receiving BEOGs pay tuition and, therefore, the recipient must provide
them with an education. The obligations incurred by the recipient insti-
tution thus increase along with its resources. 12 6 Why should that quid
pro quo demonstrate a congressional intent that the BEOG program
have a limited regulatory effect? Lower courts have suggested a quid
pro quo should reduce the recipient institution's civil rights obligations
because the institution is not being given unrestricted federal funds
which could be used to remedy any civil rights deficiencies. 127 The civil
rights statutes do not by their terms, however, give any dispensation to
recipients that incur a reciprocal obligation to non-governmental obli-
gees. If they did, they would effectively exempt virtually all important
funding statutes, because some degree of obligation generally is required
of the recipient.
With the exception of its interpretation of the term "program" in
Grove City, the Court generally has adhered to the principle that civil
rights statutes be given "a sweep as broad as [their] language."' 1 8 Had
it done so in that case, it could have adopted a purpose and effect test.
But in creating the test, it would have recognized all the purposes of
Congress in enacting BEOGs, it would have sought accurate evidence of
the impact of the funding program on an educational institution, and it
would have given no weight to the congressional intent as to regulatory
impact. If it had done so, the test that emerged would have been consis-
tent with the broad intent of Congress in enacting the civil rights
statutes.
B. Application of the Purpose and Effect Test
Except for the limited question of whether the civil rights statutes
can be enforced throughout an educational institution that accepts stu-
dents receiving BEOGs, which the court called a sui generis situation,
the Grove City decision raises more questions than it answers. Two of the
three nexus theories suggested in North Haven are inconsistent with the
application of the Grove City standard. The inconsistency is most obvi-
ous when Grove City is compared with the "program-equals-institution"
theory. Grove City also affects the direct expenditure theory, but will
have little impact on the infection theory.
125. 104 S. Ct. at 1222.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); Poole v.
Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
128. See, e.g. , North Haven, 456 U.S. at 521.
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1. Program Equals Institution. - The Grove City Court assumed that
there are funding statutes the purpose and effect of which mandate insti-
tution-wide coverage. In contrast to BEOGs, according to the Court,
such a statute would provide for "unrestricted grants that institutions
may use for whatever purpose they desire." '29 Under such a statute, as
under the second North Haven nexus theory, the program and institution
would be co-extensive; all the employees and participants would be pro-
tected by the civil rights statutes.
The Court gave no example of a qualifying statute. The compan-
ion case to Grove City, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 3° which was re-
manded for additional evidence on the program issue, involves a statute
that may meet the "purpose" half of the test. The complainant was a
handicapped engineer who was denied employment by Conrail, an en-
tity that received $3.28 billion in federal funds under the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973.3' The funding statute authorized Conrail
to use the money to modernize the rail properties of the corporation, to
acquire equipment, to refinance indebtedness, and to provide working
capital. 3 2 Under the terms of that broad funding authorization, it is
plain that the purpose of Congress in spending the money was to benefit
the entire corporation. It was alleged during the litigation that the
funds were in fact spent throughout the corporation for the purpose of
paying employees, buying equipment, and other ordinary corporate ex-
penses. On remand, therefore, the evidence may show that the funding
program increased the money available to the entire corporation.
1 33
Federal impact aid program is another example of a funding stat-
ute the purpose of which is to benefit the entire entity that receives
funds. The congressional declaration of policy indicates that Congress
intended to benefit broadly entire school systems when it enacted the
program. The policy declaration states:
In recognition of the responsibility of the United States
for the impact which certain Federal activities have on the lo-
cal educational agencies in the areas in which such activities
are carried on, the Congress declares it to be the policy of the
United States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in
this subchapter) for those local educational agencies upon
which the United States has placed financial burdens ... 34
129. Grove Ciy, 104 S. Ct. at 1221.
130. 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984).
131. 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1983).
132. 45 U.S.C. § 726(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1983).
133. See Darrone, 104 S. Ct. at 1256 n.19.
134. 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1982).
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The impact aid statute does not limit the uses to which the money may
be put. The statute provides only that it is to be paid to the local educa-
tional agencies to assist in providing free public education in the im-
pacted area." 5 If there is no recipient in an impacted area, the
commissioner may establish an educational system to provide free pub-
lic education to the children of federal personnel.1
3 6
The "effect" half of the purpose and effect test is a problem for both
the impact aid statute and the Conrail authorization statute. As in Grove
City, a quid pro quo in a funding program may evidence a congressional
intent that the statute's regulatory effect be limited. Under both the
Conrail and the impact aid programs, the recipients' resources are in-
creased by federal funding, but, at the same time, their obligations also
increase. In Conrail's case the corporation must spend money to pro-
vide rail service, and the school systems must provide educational serv-
ices to the children associated with the federal institutions. On the other
hand, in both programs the breadth of the congressional purpose is
clearly institution-wide. If a statute's purpose is more expansive than its
effect, should the civil rights statutes apply according to the more expan-
sive purpose or the more restrictive effect? Given the remedial purposes
of the civil rights statutes, the answer should be that the purpose should
control. After Grove Ciy, however, that answer is not assured.
2. Direct Expenditure Nexus. - Grove City also undermined the ex-
tent of civil rights coverage when an employee is paid with federal
funds, the first nexus suggested by the North Haven Court. As discussed
earlier, this nexus supports institution-wide enforcement if federal funds
are spent on, or for the benefit of, a person who is involved in the recipi-
ent institution due to the funds. The Grove City Court found that the
BEOG program, which fits the direct expenditure criteria,13 7 does not
support institution-wide enforcement, because Congress did not intend
that the BEOG program would have so broad a regulatory effect.
13 1
Thus, the direct expenditure theory is applicable after Grove City only
when the legislative history of the funding program provides "persua-
sive" evidence that Congress intended an institution-wide regulatory
effect.
The Court's failure to find persuasive evidence of congressional in-
tent that BEOG funding support institution-wide enforcement is sur-
prising. The BEOG student aid program and title IX were adopted as
135. Id. at § 238.
136. Id. at § 241. See supra note 112.
137. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
138. Grove Ciy, 104 S. Ct. at 1221-22.
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separate titles of the Education Amendments of 1972.' Although con-
curring on little else, proponents and opponents of title IX agreed that
the student aid programs would generate a new and pervasive level of
federal regulation of educational institutions, which had been practi-
cally free of such involvement. 4 ° Proponents of title IX urged that the
new regulatory oportunity be used to assist women, while opponents ar-
gued that title IX should be defeated because of the pervasive regula-
tory environment it would engender.14
One explanation for the wide agreement on the regulatory effect of
the BEOG program is that everyone recognized that title VI prohibited
discrimination on an institution-wide basis by institutions enrolling stu-
dents receiving student loans. 4 2 Given title IX's identical language and
the frequent reminders during the debate of their identity,143 Congress
had no reason to expect a different regulatory approach to BEOGs, un-
less it required one. Nothing in the language of the BEOG enactment
or in the debate on the Education Amendments of 1972 suggests any
limitation. 144 Even after title IX regulations were adopted and Con-
gress was advised that title IX was receiving the same administrative
treatment as title VI, neither title IX nor the BEOG program was
amended to limit the regulatory effect.'
45
139. Education amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS (86 Stat.) 293, 362, 373-75 (codifed at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a, 1681-86 (1982)).
140. See supra note 103.
141. Id.
142. 45 C.F.R. Part 80 (1972); see Grove City, 104 S. Ct. at 1226-28 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
143. See supra note 1.
144. Grove City, 104 S. Ct. at 1226-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
145. The best example of this is found in the congressional debate over HEW's assertion of
title IX regulatory authority over athletic programs, which receive no "earmarked" federal
funds, but which are subunits of institutions whose students receive BEOGs. The Subcom-
mittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor held
hearings on HEW's title IX regulations to determine whether the regulations conformed to
Congress's intent. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 103, at 1. HEW's decision that title IX
applies to athletic programs was the most controversial topic aired during the hearings. Sec-
retary Weinberger explained that the decision to include athletic programs within the cover-
age of title IX was based on the clear analogy between title IX and title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Because recipients of general, non-earmarked federal funds are subject to the
strictures of title VI under long-standing regulations, they are also subject to title IX. In light
of the contemporary administration position that BEOGs are non-earmarked funds, it is clear
that the Secretary was including BEOG funds among the federal funds he was discussing.
If the Federal funds go to an institution which has educational programs, then the
institution is covered throughout its activities. That essentially was the ruling with
respect to similar language in title VI, and that is why we used this interpretation in
title IX.
Id. at 485.
Members of Congress advised the Committee that Congress intended to include ath-
letic programs within the coverage of title IX because athletic programs are integral parts of
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It is unfortunate that the Grove City Court declined to explain why
it found the BEOG legislative history unpersuasive. The joint history of
the BEOG statute and title IX are an unusual instance of explicit Con-
gressional consideration of the effect of one statue on another. If that
history is unpersuasive, a persuasive history will be rare indeed.
3. Infection Theoy.-The third North Haven nexus theory, the infec-
tion theory, was not addressed explicitly in Grove City. Because the gov-
ernment never alleged that discrimination occurred anywhere at Grove
City College, the case involved no suggestion that discrimination outside
the financial aid program infected the program. 4 6 Although the deci-
sion neither reinforces nor restricts the infection theory, the Court's lan-
guage on a related question suggests that the theory can not be used
prophylactically as the basis for an institution-wide assurance of compli-
ance. The Court decided that an institution properly could be required,
as a condition of receiving federal funds, to execute an Assurance of
Compliance certifying that "it will conduct the aided program or activ-
ity in accordance with title IX. . . ""' The Court appears to reject
without discussion the possibility than an Assurance of Compliance
could apply to unfunded programs that might infect a funded pro-
gram.'4 8 The infection theory, therefore, seems to be limited to remedial
enforcement actions.
In the remedial sphere, the infection theory supports institution-
the programs offered by educational institutions and that discrimination in one part of the
institution cannot be severed from the rest. See, e.g. , id. at 165-67 (statement of Rep. Mink);
id at 169-71 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 199 (statement of Rep. McKinney); id. at 202
(statement of Rep. Abzug); id. at 324 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandier); id. at 217-18 (state-
ment of Holly Knox).
Senator Bayh, who had authored and introduced title IX in the Senate, was a chief
witness. Id at 175. His testimony in favor of coverage of athletic programs was reaffirmed by
other members of the Congress such as, for example, Representative Chisholm, who said that
athletic programs receiving "indirect" aid "must follow the guidelines." Id. at 65,153. Repre-
sentative Buchanan asked why title VI should apply to athletics if title IX does not: "Should
you say you don't have to have blacks on your football team or your basketball team because
they are not specifically federally funded?" Id. at 95.
The Committee heard repeated, clear and unequivocal testimony that, unless
amended, title IX, just like title VI, covers programs such as athletics in educational institu-
tions. The unquestioned assumption at the hearings was that students at the institutions
received aid such as BEOGs which could trigger civil rights coverage. Armed with this infor-
mation, Congress could have amended title IX and title VI or at least rejected the proposed
title IX regulations that were before it. Congress's failure to do either-despite numerous
opportunities-cannot be ignored as evidence that the regulations were consistent with the
congressional intent with respect to the coverage of athletics by title IX.
146. Grove Ciy, 104 S. Ct. at 1224 (Powell, J. concurring) (quoting the Administrative Law
Judge's findings).
147. Id. at 1223.
148. Id. at 1222-23.
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wide enforcement when institution-wide policies or practices must be
eliminated to prevent discrimination in a federally funded program. It
also supports enforcement in a specific unfunded program when that
discrimination affects a funded program. But what if the victim of dis-
crimination receives federal student assistance? Under Grove. City, does
that discrimination affect only the financial aid program which arranges
the aid for the student-victim? When the student-victim receives BEOG
funds, the answer is yes. But when the student-victim receives a work-
study grant under the analogous but separate work-study program, the
answer appears to be no.
Work-study students receive subsidized paychecks, rather than
grants or loans, and they may be placed in jobs anywhere in an institu-
tion. 49 As employees, they should not be subject to discrimination on
the job. The work-study program, like BEOGs, was enacted by the Ed-
ucation Amendments of 1972 to provide money to impecunious stu-
dents.1 0 Just as with BEOGs, therefore, the "funded program" for civil
rights enforcement under Grove City is the financial aid program which
determines who is eligible for subsidized employment and places eligible
students in jobs. Given the involvement of the financial aid program
with the students and the employers, discrimination against a work-
study student-employee by a non-federally supported program-em-
ployer must entangle the federally supported financial aid program. If
the discrimination occurs because of institution-wide policies or prac-
tices, the only remedy is to eliminate the policy or practice. If the dis-
crimination occurs in the specific programs in which work-study
students are placed, it should be eliminated. Given the ubiquity of
work-study students on most campuses, the only practical and effective
way to eliminate discrimination will be institution-wide enforcement."15
III. CONCLUSION
Institution-wide enforcement of the civil rights laws is the most ef-
fective means of eliminating discrimination wherever federal funds are
spent. Taken together, the Court's decisions in North Haven and Grove
City have restricted institution-wide enforcement to at most three situa-
tions: if a funding statute is unrestricted in its purpose and effect; if
federal funds pay or benefit a person entitled to protection; or if a feder-
149. See supra note 35.
150. Id.
151. Discrimination could persist in these programs if the work-study students were simply
not placed there. In practice, however, that would mean closing off job opportunities to
women, minorities and the handicapped solely because of their status, a "solution" that serves
only to raise other obvious constitutional and statutory problems.
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ally funded program is affected by discrimination occurring in a pri-
vately funded program in the institution. Under the first situation, few
if any funding programs will support institution-wide enforcement. The
second two situations have not been tested since Grove City and may fail
in significant ways. As a result, even the limited scope of institution-
wide enforcement that Grove City may permit is confused and uncertain.
Consistent and certain institution-wide enforcement authority can
be attained only by amending the civil rights statutes to overturn Grove
City. Bills to do so were introduced in both houses of Congress within
days after the decision. 52 Although the future of legislation can never
be predicted with certainty, it should be noted that a resolution support-
ing a broad reading of title IX passed the House by a vote of 414 to 9.15"
Effective civil rights enforcement is too important to the nation to
rest on the narrow and insecure foundation left after Grove City. For
nearly twenty years prior to Grove City, educational institutions and
political and business entities that received federal funds realized that
they must comply fully with the civil rights laws in essentially every
aspect of their operation. Potential victims of discrimination had the
assurance that they would not be arbitrarily subjected to discrimination
as they moved from one schoolroom to another, or one worksite to an-
other. If Congress moves rapidly to overturn Grove Ciy, these assump-
tions need not be disturbed. If it does not, the civil rights laws will be
left severely weakened.
152. Sex Discrimination in Education Reform Act of 1984, S. 2363, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1984); 130 CONG. REC. 51,890 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1984); H.R. 5011, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1984); 130 CONG. REC. H1096 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1984); S. 2568, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R.
5490, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., (1984).
153. 129 CONG. REC. H 10,085 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983); see supra note 101.
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